We re-examine the relationship between closeness and turnout by looking at aggregate-level variables and studying 57 elections. We also attempt to estimate how much voter turnout is likely to change as a function of change in the closeness of elections. Specifically, we hypothesize that in first-past-the-post elections turnout will be affected by the voters' expectation of how close the elections are going to be, by the turnout in the previous election, as well as by the closeness of the previous election. We test our hypotheses using turnout and closeness data for all 14 general elections held in the UK since 1955 and all 43 congressional elections held in the US since 1920. Our findings strongly support our hypotheses.
Non-Voting and the Decisiveness of Electoral Victories
Introduction because they believe it is their duty to ensure that some voters participate. But when turnout is expected to be high, it becomes increasingly rational to abstain. It seems reasonable to hypothesize that the larger the electorate, the lower the turnout will be. At the same time, if electorates are "large enough", one should expect differences in size to have little independent effect on turnout because the voting power of individuals is always very low (see, for example, Aldrich, 1993; Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) ; Grofman, (1993) . However, in a unique research project, Søberg and Tangerås (2003, p. 5) found that for small electorates varying in size "from 6 to a bit above 4000, with an average of 386, voter behavior conforms extremely well to the predictions of rational choice theory."
In addition to the size of the electorate, citizens may also take into account the chances of the competing candidates. In deciding whether or not to vote, they make choices based upon their expectation that one of the candidates will score a decisive victory regardless of whether or not they vote. When citizens believe that the results of an upcoming election are a fait accompli they may conclude that their own participation is redundant and decide not to vote. These "rational" non-voters may be supporters of either the predicted winner or the predicted loser. However, we would expect the tendency to abstain to be greater among the supporters of a predicted loser. Supporters of predicted winners may be motivated to vote by bandwagon effects or by the anticipated satisfaction of backing the winner. In this case, non-voting may turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy: by not voting, supporters of likely losers contribute to the decisiveness of the final results.
Non-voting due to expected decisiveness (or conversely, voting caused by the expected closeness of elections) has been examined in more than 30 studies. In a metaanalysis, Blais (2000) found that in 27 out of 32 such studies closeness of the election result was positively correlated with turnout. Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) proved that no non-dictatorial voting procedure is immune to strategic voting (or nonvoting) . On the other hand, Duverger (1963) and Cox (1997) question the logic of rational voting or non-voting when there are only two candidates or in run-off elections, while Ferejohn and Fiorina (1975) criticize the logic of such behavior under any circumstances.
Of course, rational expectations about the size or closeness of the election are by no means the only factors that contribute to the decision as to whether or not to vote. Merriam and Gosnell (1924) made a systematic study of the causes of nonparticipation eight decades ago, and four decades ago Lipset (1960) and Dahl (1961) also pioneered the study of political involvement and participation. Abundant evidence shows that many of the social variables identified by Lipset and Dahl correlate with turnout. For example, members of lower socio-economic groups tend to be far less politically involved than those belonging to higher status groups. There is abundant cross-national evidence that turnout in lower strata neighborhoods tends to be lower than that in higher strata neighborhoods. Blais (2000) , Blais and Carty (1990) , Jackman (1987) , Jackman and Miller (1995) , as well as Powell (1986) , are among the many scholars who have conducted comparative studies of turnout. In addition to the variables identified by Lipset and Dahl, they found political variables that influenced electoral participation, such as compulsory voting, proportional representation, the level of party competition, and unicameralism. It may be conjectured that such variables cause simultaneously both high/low political involvement and decisiveness/closeness of electoral victories, or that "third" variables are essential as mediators. Long-term effects, the sort of which are identified below, can definitely be seen as a result of the social environment, or local political culture, rather than as a mere reflection of decisiveness. Hence, although the correlation between the decisiveness of election results and low turnout lends some support to the hypothesis that non-voting may result from the decisiveness of elections, this correlation -as we know at least since David Hume (1711-1776) -does not prove a causal relationship.
Furthermore, as election results are known only after the election, one may argue that they cannot be a causal predictor of turnout. So although individual-level data on the relationship between voter expectations and individual-level turnout may be desirable, they may be inconclusive. However, in most cases there is no information on voters' predictions about election results; and inference from a correlation between actual results and turnout is based upon the tacit assumption that voters' anticipation of election outcomes is highly correlated with the actual results. Although there may be many voters who will not know how competitive their district is, we assume, nevertheless, that enough voters have a sufficiently accurate perception to create a relationship between actual decisiveness and turnout.
In addition to examining the correlation between decisiveness and levels of participation, we shall also examine the correlation between the decisiveness of victories in previous elections and levels of participation in following elections. We do this based on the assumption that citizens' decision to vote or abstain may be based upon the anticipation that the closeness of the upcoming elections will be similar to the closeness in previous elections. Moreover, inasmuch as a strong correlation is found between (perceived) decisiveness/closeness of elections and levels of participation, we will be able to estimate by means of regression analysis how much levels of participation in a given election increase/decrease as a function of change in the level of decisiveness/closeness both in a given election as well as in a previous elections.
In view of the above, our first two hypotheses are:
1. The higher the decisiveness of an electoral victory in a given electoral district at a given time, the lower participation will tend to be.
The higher the decisiveness of an electoral victory in a given electoral district
at a given time, the lower the level of participation in the following election will tend to be.
Our second hypothesis is based on the expectation that previous behavior serves as a good predictor of future behavior. But it is not easy to examine whether or not voters have this expectation. Hence we advance our third and fourth hypotheses:
at a given time, the more decisive the victory in the same electoral district will tend to be in the following elections. 4. The higher the level of participation in a given electoral district at a given time, the higher the level of participation in the same district will tend to be in the following elections.
Most previous analyses focus only on the relationships posited by the first hypothesis. But if we can find support for hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 as well, the argument that rational non-voting is caused by anticipating decisive victories will be strengthened considerably. Moreover, it makes sense to assume that for those US elections in our study that were conducted prior to the advent of reliable polls the perception of voters regarding decisiveness of any given election had to rely mainly on their knowledge regarding decisiveness in the previous election (hypotheses 2,3). Even so, one could still argue that the predicted relationships occurred because of an additional variable that causes both decisiveness (or closeness) and participation (or non-participation).
Therefore we will further strengthen our thesis by examining two additional hypotheses:
Decisiveness of electoral victories is better predicted when employing previous
decisiveness and level of participation than when predicting on the basis of decisiveness alone.
Level of participation is better predicted when employing previous level of participation and decisiveness than when predicting on the basis of participation alone.
Support for these two final hypotheses will provide strong evidence that rational non-voting results from the anticipation that the electoral result is likely to be decisive, and not only from possible social and cultural factors.
The Data Set
Our data base consists of all 14 general elections to the UK's House of Commons during the period 3 and all the 43 biennial elections to the US House of Representatives during the period from 1920 through 2004. In the case of the UK our decision to begin with the 1955 General Election was largely driven by the fact that computerized data were readily available only for the elections held since 1955. In the study of US elections, on the other hand, we were compelled to create our own data set regarding turnout since there is no available data file for the population of Congressional districts. Consequently, we began our investigation with the 1920 elections, the first since women were enfranchised throughout the US.
We chose the UK and the US because both these countries employ the same electoral procedure for electing the lower chamber of their legislatures: single-member constituency systems with first-past-the-post (FPTP) criterion of winning. 4 Arguably, this electoral procedure is the most susceptible to rational non-voting, and hence the most suitable for testing our hypotheses.
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We wish to stress, however, that because there are important relevant differences between the US and the UK, which we were unable to control, we expected that the strength of the correlations between turnout and decisiveness in each of these countries may be different. Thus, for example, it is well established that participation in a
Congressional election in the US is higher when it coincides with a presidential election than when it occurs in a subsequent midterm year. Similarly, unlike the situation in the UK, where the election for MPs does not coincide with other elections for higher public offices, even during off-year elections members of the US House of Representatives usually run in contests that also choose higher officials such as US senators or governors.
Despite these differences between the US and the UK we expect our hypotheses to be supported in both these countries.
In the Appendix we list the sources and some particular characteristics of the data in each of these two countries.
Finally, a word is in order regarding the operational definition we used for measuring the degree of closeness (or decisiveness) of an election. Various authors have used different measures for this variable. Thus, for example, Søberg and Tangerås (2003, p. 7) measure "expected closeness" of a referendum by using the formula 1/ | ω -0.5|, where ω and 1 -ω denote, respectively, the proportion of the electorate that voted in favor of the proposition and the proportion that voted against it. However, if we require that a measure of closeness must be defined for any value of ω, it is clear that this measure fails to do so because it is undefined when ω = 0.5.
We believe that a more intuitively meaningful measure of closeness, C, for the type of elections that we are concerned with, is given by the formula
where x is the number of votes polled by the winning candidate, and y is the number of votes polled by the runner up. As is expected from an index, this relative measure of closeness ranges between 0 (when a single candidate obtains all the votes) and 1 (when there is a tie between the two leading candidates). Decisiveness is then defined to be
Findings
In plurality (FPTP) contests when the number of voters is large enough, the expected difference in the proportion of votes given to the two leading candidates serves as a good indicator for the probability of decisiveness of electoral outcomes on both the intuitive and the mathematical levels 6 . Tables 1 and 2 where the dependent variable is the anticipated level of participation in a given election and the independent variable is, alternatively, the (perceived) decisiveness in the given election or the decisiveness in the previous election.
It should be noted, in this context, that redistricting is a key issue for both the UK and the US. When major changes were made, such as after each American census, we refrained from making some of the calculations (see Tables 1,3 and 5 below, and our notes to Tables 4 and 6) 7 .
( Tables 1 and 2 about here) As all the coefficients in these tables are negative, our first two hypotheses are supported: the higher the decisiveness of an electoral victory in a given electoral district at a given time, the lower the level of participation tends to be; and the higher the decisiveness of an electoral victory in a given electoral district at a given time, the lower the level of participation in the following election tends to be.
The mean value of the correlation coefficient between participation and decisiveness in the same elections (-0.60 in the US case and -0.39 in the UK case) is slightly stronger than the mean correlation coefficient between participation in a given election and decisiveness in the previous election (-0.52 in US elections and -0.37 in UK elections).
One possible conclusion one can draw from the slightly stronger correlations between participation and decisiveness in the same elections is that voters tend to base their decision on whether to participate or to abstain in given elections more on indicators of closeness regarding these elections than on indicators of closeness regarding previous elections in the same district.
It is also interesting to note that over time the investigated correlation coefficients tend to become weaker in the US, but there is no such tendency in the UK. Thus,
Pearson's coefficient of linear correlation, r, between the year of elections and the correlation coefficient for decisiveness-participation was 0.83 (N=43) in the US, i.e., the later the election the less extreme r tends to be. The corresponding coefficient in the UK was negligible (-0.17, N=14).
Although there has been a gradual decline in the US in the strength of the correlation between decisiveness and participation, there also appears to be a more pronounced decline after 1960, the year when turnout reached an all-time high during the entire 84-year period we investigated. This change occurred at the same time as other changes in the electoral behavior in the US: the year 1960 was just before party identification in the US began to weaken. 8 Moreover, after the Voting Rights Act of 1965 the turnout of black voters rose dramatically in the South and, with many whites beginning to switch to Republican candidates, turnout rose in southern Congressional districts. Since the South used to have substantially lower turnout than the rest of the US, constituency-level variation in the US as a whole declined.
We wish also to point out that the 1983 election in the UK, the year of Thatcher's greatest triumph, is a clear outlier in which the relationship between decisiveness of electoral victory and level of participation was much lower than in any election during the period we investigated (see Table 2 column 2). Even voters who lived in competitive districts should have known that the Conservatives were very likely to win the 1983
General Election, for throughout the entire campaign polls showed the Conservative party with a massive lead over Labour (see Butler and Kavanagh, 1984, p. 126) . On the other hand, pre-election polls consistently predicted a Labour victory in 2001 (see Butler and Kavanagh, 2002, pp. 123-125) , which seems to have contributed to low national turnout, while the relationships in Table 2 are the highest among all 14 elections.
Although the correlation coefficients displayed in columns 2-3 of Tables 1-2 demonstrate strong associations between election closeness and turnout, these coefficients give no hint as to the magnitude of these effects, i.e., by how much the level of participation is likely to decrease as a function of a 1-unit increase in the level of decisiveness. Given the level of participation and decisiveness for each constituency In the fourth and fifth columns of Tables 1-2 we display only the (negative) coefficients (b) of the independent variable (x), which represents, alternatively, the level of decisiveness in the given election (fourth column of Tables 1-2) or the level of decisiveness in the previous election (fifth column of Tables 1-2) .
For all but five regression equations in UK elections (those for the 1970, 10/1974, 1979, 1983, and 2005 elections) , as well as for all but four regression equations in US elections (those for the 1934, 1938, 1946 , and 1964 elections), we obtained that the magnitudes of the a (constant) and b (slope) variables were always higher when the independent variable (x) represented the level of (perceived) decisiveness in a given election than when the independent variable represented the level of decisiveness in the previous election.
Overall we obtained that the mean slopes of the regression lines for the US congressional elections were -0.314 when the independent variable represented the level of decisiveness in the given election and -0.286 when it represented the level of decisiveness in the previous election. The respective mean slopes obtained for the UK elections were -0.145 and -0.138. This implies that the anticipated reduction in the level of participation in a given US congressional elections is, on average, more than twice as large as that in UK elections when there is a 1-unit increase either in the perceived level of decisiveness of the given election or in the level of decisiveness of a previous election.
These results also imply that (perceived) closeness matters, but not a lot: we would expect, on average, an extremely close elections (a perceived tie) to increase turnout by about 3 points in the US and by about 1.5 points in the UK, compared with an election in which one party leads by 10 points. Tables 3 and 4 we can definitely state that previous behavior serves as an excellent predictor of future behavior. Hence our third and fourth hypotheses are clearly supported: the higher the decisiveness of an electoral victory in a given electoral district at a given time, the more decisive the victory in the same electoral district will tend to be in the following elections; and the higher the level of participation in a given electoral district at a given time, the higher will the level of participation in the same district will tend to be in the following elections.
All correlation coefficients in Tables 3 and 4 Table 5 .
Similarly, according to Table 3 Table 5 .
( Tables 5 and 6 It seems therefore that our fifth and sixth hypotheses are also supported.
Decisiveness of electoral victories is better predicted when employing previous decisiveness and level of participation than when predicting on the basis of decisiveness The relationship between additional contribution of decisiveness and additional contribution of participation is quite weak. The Pearson's coefficient of the correlation between these two additional contributions over the years is only 0.38 in the US and only -0.12 in the UK.
Participation contributes on average to the prediction of decisiveness (as an additional variable to past behavior) more than the mean additional contribution of decisiveness to the prediction of participation. Hence, there is support for our conjecture that non-participation based on anticipated decisiveness is higher amongst supporters of expected losers and that it acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Comparison between midterm Congressional elections and those held in presidential years shows that relationships in midterm elections are slightly stronger.
Thus, the mean r between closeness of races and participation in midterm elections is -0.62 compared with -0.58 in presidential years. It is interesting to note that the correlation between participation and closeness tends to decline at a similar pace for
Congressional elections held in presidential years and for those held in midterm years.
The Pearson correlation between the year of elections and the respective correlation between closeness and participation in that year is 0.88 for elections held in presidential years as well as for those held in midterm years.
The relationships tend to be stronger in the US than in the UK. Thus, the mean r As shown in Table 7 repeats itself: the overall mean participation percent in Dominant electoral districts over all elections of a given type is significantly lower not only compared to the overall mean participation percent in Dual districts, but also compared to Mixed ones.
Again, this was true also for every US election.
It can also be seen from Table 8 that the overall mean participation rate for each type of district was lower for midterm elections than for House elections conducted in presidential years. Moreover, for each midterm election, without exception, the mean participation rate in each type of district was lower than the mean participation rate in the respective type of district in both the preceding and following (presidential) elections.
( 
Discussion
The relationship between election closeness and turnout is an important subject, which has generated a wide-ranging scholarly literature. As our re-examination of this subject is based on an extremely comprehensive data set that extends back over many decades in both the UK and the US -which is the first novelty of this paper -it enables us to draw quite general conclusions. Nevertheless, although our findings lend strong support to all six of our hypotheses -which is the second novelty of this paper -we think that the following issues ought to be further examined.
First, are there alternative explanations for these findings? In particular, can one interpret these findings without reference to rational choice arguments? As is well known, the most important recent critique of rational-choice theory in political science is the book by Green and Shapiro (1994) , which contains a whole chapter on the "paradox of voter turnout". In view of this critique we think it is fair to say that our findings do not definitively demonstrate the existence of rational non-voting. However, we do argue that our six hypotheses could not easily be generated without making assumptions about voter rationality.
Nevertheless, it may be argued that the (Downsian) rational choice theory we examine is entirely at the individual voter's level, i.e., that we attribute "rationality" considerations only to voters in the sense that their turnout decisions are entirely influenced by their own expectations about election closeness and that we ignore, both in our hypotheses and in our empirical analysis, other "rational" relevant agents, such as the role of party organizations in canvassing and get-out-the-vote efforts in those districts where political leaders anticipate close elections. Using a rational choice perspective, Jacobson and Kernell (1981, pp. 35-39) Table 6 , second column). It seems to us that the best way to interpret this additional contribution is the decisiveness of electoral victories anticipated by voters.
Second, it might be useful to explore the type of individual-level data that would support or fail to support our findings. We are convinced that, at least with respect to the US, no individual-level data exists to test the investigated relationships on the level of Congressional districts. National Election Study surveys conducted in the US do contain questions about how close the respondent thinks a presidential election will be, and sometime also questions about how close the respondent thinks the presidential election will be in his or her state. In most elections, respondents who think the election will be close are more likely to vote than those who think the winner will win "by quite a bit" Election (Butler and Kavanagh, 1975, pp. 190-191) , and most predicted a narrow Labour victory in 1992 (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992, pp. 123-141) . Granted British preelection polls are generally accurate in mirroring the election outcome (Crewe, 1992 (Crewe, , 1997 (Crewe, , 2001 (Crewe, , 2005 
Appendix
We list here the detailed sources and some particular characteristics of the data in each of the two investigated countries.
US
The election results in each of the 435 US Congressional districts for the 43 Having established (from census data and other sources listed below) the number of persons of voting age residing in a given Congressional district in census year x and in the next census year x+10 (e.g. in the years 1990 and 2000), we assumed that the annual rate of growth (or decline) in the number of voting-age persons in that district during the entire decade remained constant, and we used the common formula of compound interest rate to estimate the number of voting-age persons in that district for each election year during the decade. 11 Of course we used this estimation method only for those districts whose boundaries did not change between two consecutive censuses. Moreover, this estimation method disregards completely non-citizen residents who are not eligible to vote in any state, as well as the increasing number of felons and ex-felons who are ineligible to vote (see Manza and Uggen, 2006) . -0.150 -1990 -0.535 -0.279 -0.202 -0.112 1988 -0.521 -0.366 -0.208 -0.148 1986 -0.497 -0.263 -0.170 -0.087 1984 -0.537 -0.422 -0.197 -0.159 1982 -0.474 --0.166 -1980 -0.467 -0.417 -0.236 -0.200 1978 -0.510 -0.352 -0.208 -0.149 1976 -0.525 -0.539 -0.235 -0.225 1974 -0.647 -0.423 -0.260 -0.186 1972 -0.589 --0.281 -1970 -0.611 -0.466 -0.268 -0.207 1968 -0.571 -0.471 -0.276 -0.219 1966 -0.548 -0.433 -0.268 -0.213 1964 -0.505 -0.549 -0.327 -0.346 1962 -0.552 --0.472 -1960 -0.692 -0.671 -0.525 -0.475 1958 -0.772 -0.616 -0.471 -0.418 1956 -0.675 -0.689 -0.458 -0.441 1954 -0.762 -0.695 -0.423 -0.389 1952 -0.724 --0.446 -1950 -0.614 -0.662 -0.506 -0.440 1948 -0.624 -0.714 439 0. --0.429 1946 -0.714 -0.707 -0.419 -0.445 1944 -0.807 -0.715 -0.503 -0.424 1942 -0.755 --0.374 -1940 -0.765 -0.758 -0.509 -0.492 1938 -0.788 -0.750 -0.506 -0.519 1936 -0.772 -0.713 -0.513 -0.432 1934 -0.736 -0.716 -0.406 -0.421 1932 -0.748 --0.413 -1930 -0.770 -0.638 -0.363 -0.335 1928 -0.650 -0.624 -0.413 -0.375 1926 -0.725 -0.607 -0.340 -0.292 1924 -0.736 -0.673 -0.403 -0.356 1922 -0.750 -0.560 -0.344 -0.292 1920 -0.564 --0. 333 - #7, 19, 23, 24, 25, and Louisiana district #4) there was only a single candidate who according to these states' laws was declared winning without election. However, in order to evaluate how total lack of competition affects turnout, we included in our analysis those districts in which a candidate ran unopposed but elections nevertheless did take place. 2 In six of the 435 House districts (Florida districts # 10, 11, 12, 14, 20, 21) there was only a single candidate who according to Florida law was declared winning without election.
3 These 14 elections were conducted in 1955 , 1959 , 1964 , 1966 , 1970 , October 1974 , 1979 , 1987 , 1992 Louisiana (which currently elects seven representatives) is an exception. It uses a nonpartisan primary with a runoff if no candidate receives a majority. 5 If the cost of participating in an election is negligible, it may be argued that under the FPTP procedure it is rational for a voter to participate in an election only if she feels that there is a reasonable chance that her vote will be decisive, i.e., given the manner in which all other voters have cast their votes, that her vote will either create or break a tie. However this chance is extremely small even for a moderately large number of voters. In contrast, it can be argued that under (list) proportional representation (PR) systems it is always rational for a citizen to vote because (ignoring the common threshold requirement) the number of seats each party gets in the legislature is very nearly proportional to the number of votes it received in the election.
Consequently under PR each vote has a reasonably high probability of increasing the number of seats allocated to the party for which it was cast. And indeed, Helin and Nurmi (2004) found that the turnout in PR municipal elections in Finland was hardly affected by the degree of electoral competition. Similarly, Grönlund (2004) found in his empirical study that the local political context affects voter turnout clearly in the UK (where FPTP is used), whereas these effects are less apparent in Finland (where PR is used). More comparative research under various election procedures is needed in order to ascertain more systematically the effects of closeness of elections on voters' participation. 6 It should be remembered that although both the US and the UK use the FPTP method, the number of effective parties in the US is smaller than that in the UK, which in turn decreases the average proportion of votes gained by the two leading candidates in UK constituencies as compared to the respective average proportion in US congressional districts. If this were the only relevant difference between the UK and the US then one might expect that the average level of decisiveness in the UK would be smaller than that in the US, which in turn may lead to an increase in the average level of participation in the UK in comparison to that in the US. However, since there are other relevant differences between the US and the UK which cannot be controlled (e.g., the average number of eligible voters per constituency is larger in the US than in the UK), we are unable to state to what extent, if at all, the difference between these countries in terms of effective number of parties has affected the average level of decisiveness observed in them.
denotes the constant annual rate, and N 1 and N 10 are the voting-age population at the beginning and at the end of the decade, respectively. Having thus obtained r, we use the compound interest rate formula N n = N 1 (1+ r) n to obtain the number of voting-age persons in the district for every year n in which a (biennial) Congressional election was conducted during the decade (n = 2,4,6,8).
12 Due to the death of the Liberal Democrat candidate in Staffordshire South shortly before the probably explained by the fact that this constituency has been a safe Conservative seat for many years, plus the fact that the parliamentary elections were held there seven weeks after they were already held in the rest of the UK with candidates of both the Labour and Liberal-Democratic parties replaced shortly before the election.
13 ARK (the Northern Ireland Social and Political Archive) is a joint resource of the two Northern Ireland universities whose goal is to make social science information on Northern Ireland available to the widest possible public.
